A common belief is that distributed dispatch algorithms enable privacy preservation for power system agents: each agent optimizes its local optimization by means of primal-dual communication without disclosing its sensitive data, e.g., load. However, sensitive information can be inferred by a potential adversary from responses of agents to communication signals over iterations. To ensure information integrity, this paper leverages the concept of differential privacy to develop privacy-preserving distributed algorithms for optimal power flow (OPF) problem. We first distribute the OPF problem using consensus alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), and then introduce two methods to provide differential privacy: dual and primal variable perturbations. The perturbations are random and drawn from a carefully parameterized Laplace distribution, such that inferring agent data from primal-dual communication conforms to random guessing. The main benefit is that the privacy of each agent can be quantified and provably guaranteed up to user-specified privacy parameters. Moreover, unlike common differentially private algorithms, there is no privacy loss accumulated across ADMM iterations. A series of numerical experiments across NESTA testbeds supports our theoretical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a centralized optimization, the system operator collects power system data, e.g., loads, and solves optimal power flow (OPF) problem to find dispatch solution. Even at the aggregated level, the release of load data poses privacy risks for system agents. For instance, in 2016, 60 vendors in the US offered load profiling (e.g., quantification and shaping) of electrical appliances from aggregated load data [1] , thus compromising the privacy of individual consumers. As an alternative, distributed algorithm have been advocated to distribute the OPF problem among power system agents, so they exchange a limited amount of information [2] . One approach is to distribute the OPF task among nodes (that act as agents) that coordinate through primal-dual exchange with neighbors [3] - [6] . The clear benefit is that agents communicate only certain variables, keeping loads private. The privacy, though, remains at risk, as loads can be revealed from communications, particularly when subproblems admit closed-form solutions, as in [6] . Hence, distributed OPF needs to be augmented with additional privacy-preserving practices to enhance integrity.
Differential privacy, first formalized by Dwork et al. [7] , [8] , is a framework that allows to quantify the privacy risk associated with computing functions (queries) on datasets comprising sensitive information. The original concept provides strong guarantees (up to user-specified privacy parameter) that the removal or addition of a single item in a dataset will not allow an adversary to distinguish the presence of this item from the query output. More recent metric-based differential privacy by Chatzikokolakis et al. [9] , offer, instead, masking the magnitude of dataset items from a query output. For example, instead of hiding the presence of load, one can protect the value of this load up to a specified parameter. Commonly, the privacy guarantees spring out from the so-called Laplace mechanism that perturbs query output with the noise drawn from the Laplace distribution defined in the sensitivity of the output to the items in a dataset. Hence, a differentially private mechanism is necessarily random, as for a given dataset its output obeys a particular probability distribution.
In the optimization context, differential privacy has been applied to empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem, which is a simple instance of unconstrained optimization. Chaudhuri et al. [10] develop a differentially private mechanism to solve centralized ERM problem. Here, the ERM problem casts as a query, and either output or objective Laplacebased perturbations achieve privacy of training data. Zhang et al. [11] extend the application to a version of ERM based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) that provides privacy to each subproblem (node) comprising sensitive training data. In this distributed context, the privacy follows from perturbations of either primal or dual variables at every iteration. The drawback of [11] is a privacy loss induced by every new iteration, as more information revealed. Therefore, [11] offers guarantees only for a single iteration. Zhang et al. [12] minimize the loss by finding tighter bounds on the sensitivity of subproblems, but the guarantees still apply to a finite number of iterations.
In power systems, differential privacy is used to release OPF testbeds from the real network involving sensitive data [13] - [15] . Zhou et al. [13] explore the monotonicity properties of the OPF problem to release the entire system data privately for DC OPF studies. Fioretto et al. in [14] and [15] offer mechanisms to release load and transmission parameters in the context of AC OPF with a special emphasis on restoring the feasibility of OPF solution. There are also a few applications of differential privacy to operational problems. Zhao et al. [16] show that battery-based load hiding problem fails to achieve load privacy with available smart metering data, and offer differentially private setup to mask the actual load of appliances. Han et al. [17] build a privacy-aware distributed algorithm for electrical vehicle charging, compromising the inference of actual charging power from communication signals.
In this work, we explore the use of differential privacy in the
Neighborhoods:
Illustration of the node-wise decomposition of the 3-node power network: the original network on the left, and its mirrored decomposed counterpart on the right. The original network is restored when enforcing consensus constraints for every node across its neighborhood.
context of distributed OPF problem based on the consensus-ADMM as in [3] and [4] . In the underlying problem, the agents (nodes) negotiate voltage angle variables without disclosing loads. However, we show that there exist privacy-violating conditions that allow an adversary with side information to infer the load from agent response to input signals. Motivated by this scenario, we propose privacy-preserving ADMM algorithms for the distributed OPF: 1) We devise two privacy-preserving ADMM algorithms using primal and dual variable perturbations (Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively). In the former, the output of agent subproblems is perturbed with a noise respecting its sensitivity to load. In the latter, the subproblem of each agent is perturbed itself by injecting a properly calibrated noise to dual variables before solving the optimization. 2) We derive theoretical guarantees (Theorems 2 and 3) that the two algorithms provide differential privacy up to user-specified privacy parameters. Furthermore, we show that there is no additional privacy loss (information gain) induced with additional ADMM iterations (Theorem 4). 3) Using a series of power system testbeds, we explore the practical use of differential privacy. First, we show that with a fine tuning of privacy parameters, the inference of loads from primal-dual communication conforms to random guessing. On the other hand, the recorded optimality loss induced due to noisy responses limits the application only to nodes with smaller sensitivities. The remainder is outlined as follows. In Sections II and III, we streamline ADMM-based OPF problem and associated privacy risks. Section IV presents the main contributions on privacy-preserving OPF algorithms. Section V presents supporting numerical experiments. Section VI concludes.
II. ADMM-BASED DISTRIBUTED OPF
We consider a high-voltage power network modeled by an undirected graph Γ (B, Λ), where B is the set of nodes and Λ is the set of transmission lines connecting those nodes. Using the DC power flow model, susceptance β ∈ R |Λ| + and capacity f ∈ R |Λ| + describe transmission lines. We use mapping functions s : Λ → B and r : Λ → B to return sending and receiving ends of transmission lines, respectively. The last network descriptor is the susceptance matrix B ∈ R |B|×|B| , whose non-diagonal elements amount to the negative susceptance of the corresponding line, and diagonal elements sum up to the susceptance of all adjacent lines. Vector d ∈ R |B| + collects controllable loads that can be adjusted in both directions by s ∈ R |B| within a range [d, d] ∈ R |B| . The cost of adjustment follows quadratic function s ⊤ Qs, where Q ∈ R |B|×|B| + is a diagonal matrix with entries denoted as q i . This adjustment is assumed to be offset by any mean of flexibility, e.g., demand response or distributed energy resources, behind the transmission-distribution interface. More explicit modeling of this flexibility is provided in [18] , which is compatible with the proposed algorithms. The generation nodes output p ∈ R |B| + within a range [p, p] at costs described by second-and firstorder coefficients collected in
where C 2 is a diagonal matrix with entries denoted as c 2i . The optimal power flow solution constitutes the generator and load set-points so as a vector θ ∈ R |B| of voltage angles provided by solving min p,s,θ
where (1a) minimizes the total generation and load adjustment cost, (1b) limits power flows, (1c) bounds controllable power, and (1d) balances nodal power injections. Following [3] , [4] , the OPF in (1) admits a suitable distributed scheme, where nodes act as agents. Fig. 1 shows the OPF problem distribution among nodes by means of duplicating voltage angles, i.e., θ ∈ R |B| ⇒ θ ∈ R |B|×|B| , whose columns collect agent estimates of voltage angles across the network. The scheme enforces
where θ ∈ R |B| is the consensus variable, θ i ∈ R |B| is the i th column of the matrix of duplicated voltage angles θ, and µ i ∈ R |B| is the i−specific vector of dual variables. By dualizing (2) and adding the corresponding proximal term, we obtain the OPF problem suitable for agent-wise ADMM decomposition:
reads as x ⊤ diag (ρ) x, and ρ ∈ R |B| + is a penalty factor that is assumed constant across ADMM iterations. By denoting the iteration counter by ν, the distributed variant of OPF problem in (1) formulates as follows [19] :
The convergence is recorded whenever the difference between consensus variables and agent local estimates is reduced to some user-specified tolerance γ, i.e.,
Notice that the algorithms in (4) solely requires exchanging primal and dual variables of (2) across ADMM iterations.
III. PRIVACY RISK AND ATTACK MODELS
Although loads are not exchanged across ADMM iterations, the privacy risk still exists. Here, we show that under certain conditions the loads can be inferred from agent responses. We narrow down our scope to two types of nodes:
1. PV-node with a controllable generator and fixed load. The flexibility is solely provided by the generator. 2. PQ-node with a controllable load and no generation. The flexibility is solely provided by the ability of the load to adjust the consumption within available range. This scope is not restrictive as any node is representable by a combination of nodes above in a lossless DC power flow model. The presence of a flexible resource at the attacked node is a prerequisite to provide privacy. For example, the load at PV-node is expressed from (1d) as
Even knowing flow injections, the attacker cannot infer the load as generator set-points are not exchanged.
The information assumed possibly available to the attacker amounts to: (i) cost function of the flexible resource at the attacked node, (ii) network topology and transmission data and (iii) algorithm data such as factor ρ and the structure of agent optimization problems. This information suffices for the successful inference of the load when intercepting agent communications. Indeed, the stationarity conditions, obtained in Appendix A, can be used to build the inference model that returns load estimates as a function of optimization parameters and agent responses. The estimates of load at node i are collected in vectord ν i ∈ R |Ni| of dimension |N i |. In particular, for any node j in the neighborhood N i , the load at the attacked node i is obtained at some iteration ν as:
where (5a) and (5b) relate to PV-node and PQ-node, respectively. In (5a) and (5b), the last terms include the dual variables associated with capacity limits of the flexible resource
) of node i and thermal capacity of the adjacent transmission lines (λ f,ν l ) (see Appendix A for the details). Remark 1. As the true load is unknown to the attacker, the dual variables of local constraints can not be deduced. Therefore, the only case when attack models in (5) provide a meaningful result (i.e.,d ν ij = d i , ∀j ∈ N i ) is when the duals are zero (the last terms in (5a) and (5b) amount to zero).
Hence, we define the following privacy-violating conditions. We can now state the problem.
Problem. Devise the privacy-preserving variant of distributed OPF in (4) that does not allow for disclosure of agent loads under Conditions 1 and 2 at any iteration.
IV. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR DISTRIBUTED OPF
Here, we review a necessary background on differential privacy and offer two privacy-preserving ADMM algorithms.
A. Differential privacy
The goal of differential privacy is to protect agent datasets containing sensitive information. In the context of this work, the dataset D i of agent i includes parameters used in local optimization. We consider agent local optimizations (4a) as queries Q i : D i → θ i that map agent data into voltage angle estimates. The concept of differential privacy suggests to randomize the output of the queries such that an adversary will not be able to distinguish what dataset D i is used to compute θ i . Consider two adjacent (different in one value) datasets D i and D ′ i that can be made indistinguishable on random query up to some constant α according to the following definition.
Definition 1 (α-adjacency of two datasets [9] ). Two datasets D = {e k } n k=1 and D ′ = {e ′ k } n k=1 are said to be α-adjacent for some α > 0, i.e., D ∼ α D ′ , if there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that e k − e ′ k 1 α and e j = e ′ j , ∀j = k. The adjacency α is chosen according to the privacy requirement and may be set, for example, to some portion of load, e.g., 50%, to hide any change in a given load amounting up to α. A randomized query that acts on a dataset is said to be differential private up to some value ǫ, if it guarantees that an adversary will not be able to distinguish what dataset, e.g., D or D ′ , has been used to compute the query output. The following gives more formal definition.
Algorithm 1 Primal perturbation (PP-ADMM)
Input: agent data: Di; privacy parameters: ǫi, αi; algorithmic data: γ, ρ, ν, starting point: θ 0 , µ 0 . Output: ǫi−differentially private distributed OPF solution.
Step 1: find ∆i using (7) , draw ξi ∈ Lap(∆i/ǫi), ∀i.
Step 2: update θ ν i using (4a), ∀i.
Step 3: perturb output according toθ ν i ← θ ν i + ξi, ∀i.
Step 4: update θ ν using (4b) and perturbed outputsθ ν i , ∀i.
Step 5: update µ ν i using (4c) and perturbed outputsθ ν i , ∀i. Definition 2 (ǫ−differential privacy [9] ). A randomized querỹ Q : S → R with domain S and range R preserves ǫ−differential privacy if for any output Θ ∈ R and all adjacent datasets D ∼ α D ′ ∈ S for a fixed α > 0, it holds that
where probability is taken over runs ofQ.
The user-specified ǫ 0 is called privacy loss. Both privacy loss ǫ and adjacency α allow for quantifying and controlling the privacy risk. In particular, the stronger privacy is achieved with smaller values of ǫ and larger values of α.
According to the sensitivity-based method by Dwork et al. [8] , a query can be made differential private by injecting a carefully calibrated noise to its output. The amount of noise depends on the sensitivity of the query to changes in a dataset.
Definition 3 (Sensitivity of queries [8] ). The sensitivity of a query Q(D), denoted as ∆ Q , amounts to the optimal solution of the following optimization problem:
where D and D ′ are two α-adjacent datasets in the query domain defined according to Definition 1.
According to [8] , the noise is provided by a zero-mean Laplace distribution, denoted by Lap (λ), with scale λ and probability density function f (x|λ) = 1 2λ exp (−|x|/λ). Theorem 1 (Laplace mechanism [8] ). Let Q : D → R be a query that maps dataset D to real numbers. The Laplace mechanism that outputs Q (D) + ξ, where ξ ∼ Lap (∆ Q /ǫ), achieves ǫ−differential privacy.
Hence, by adding a sensitivity-cognizant noise to the query output, an adversary cannot distinguish what dataset is used to compute the query. In what follows, we propose two randomized versions of the ADMM algorithm in (4) that preserve load privacy according to the sensitivity-based method.
B. Primal perturbation algorithm (PP-ADMM)
In this algorithm, the output of agent queries is perturbed by the noise calibrated respecting the sensitivity of the output to load. Therefore, for every agent i we consider two loads d i and d ′ i different up to α i > 0. The load sensitivity of agent i, denoted as ∆ i ∈ R |N|i , computes with respect to every Algorithm 2 Dual perturbation (DP-ADMM) Input: agent data: Di; privacy parameters: ǫi, αi; algorithmic data: γ, ρ, ν, starting point: θ 0 , µ 0 . Output: ǫi−differentially private distributed OPF solution.
Step 1: find∆i using (9), draw ξi ∈ Lap(∆i/ǫi), ∀i.
Step 2: perturb duals according toμ ν 1 i ← µ ν 1 i + ξi, ∀i.
Step 3: update θ ν i using (4a) andμ ν 1 i , ∀i.
Step 4: update θ ν according to (4b).
Step 5: update µ ν i , ∀i according to (4c).
Step 6: stop if (4d) holds or ν = ν, o/w go to Step 2. node in the neighborhood. The agent load sensitivities share an important property, i.e., Proposition 1. Whenever Conditions 1-2 hold, the load sensitivity of each agent is constant across ADMM iterations.
Proof. Under Conditions 1-2, the dual variables of local constraints in stationary conditions (11) in Appendix A amount to zero. Then, if we consider the difference of two sets of conditions (11) for agent i enforced on adjacent loads d i and d ′ i , respectively, we see that this difference is independent from dual and consensus variables µ i and θ. As there are no more varying parameters, we see that
As sensitivities are independent from dual and consensus variables, we compute them for each agent i as
where θ i (d i ) for some load valued i obtains as
for PV-nodes, and
for PQ-nodes, where dual and consensus variables µ i and θ are set to zero. Now, we outline the first privacy-preserving distributed OPF summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Dual perturbation algorithm (DP-ADMM)
As apposed to query output perturbation, it has been proposed to perturb a query itself [10] . The experiments in [11] and [12] demonstrate that in the distributed setting, the objective function perturbation is preferred over primal output due to better convergence properties. Following this rationale, we introduce a randomize ADMM with dual variable perturbations summarized in Algorithm 2. The goal of DP-ADMM is to maintain the same probability distribution of query output as in PP-ADMM by carefully calibrating the noise applied to the dual variables. More formally, we aim at maintaining the following probability density function of query outputs
which is centered around the true agent response with the scale corresponding to the sensitivity (7) and privacy coefficient. To achieve (8) through dual perturbation, we explore the primal-dual relationship provided by the stationarity conditions in (11) . Fortunately, they establish a linear and constant dependency of primal response on dual variable for agent i, e.g., θ ij ∝ µ ij /[2c 2i B 2 ij + ρ], j ∈ N i for PV-nodes. Hence, agent queries output according to (8) by perturbing the dual variables with the noise drawn from Lap(∆ ij /ǫ i ), wherẽ
for PV-nodes, and similarlỹ
for PQ-nodes.
D. Privacy guarantees
We provide the following guarantees for the two randomized variants of the distributed OPF problem in (4).
Theorem 2. Under privacy-violating Conditions 1 and 2, PP-ADMM preserves ǫ i −differential privacy.
Proof. Consider a probability density function of the agent randomized response in PP-ADMM f (θ ij |D i ) computed on dataset D i , that includes all necessary parameters to compute response under Condition 1 and 2. For any adjacent dataset D ′ i defined according to Definition 1, and for the given distribution of noise Lap (λ i ) with scale λ i , the following holds:
where the last inequality holds due to triangle inequality of norms. As θ ′ ij and θ ij are true agent responses computed, respectively, on D ′ i and D i adjacent datasets, we have that θ ′ ij − θ ij 1 = ∆ ij due to Proposition 1. Finally, we know that in PP-ADMM the noise is scaled with λ i = ∆ ij /ǫ i , so we eventually arrive to
as required by Definition 2.
Theorem 3. Under privacy-violating Conditions 1 and 2, DP-ADMM preserves ǫ i −differential privacy.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorem 2 and the fact that the agent subproblems in DP-ADMM outputs according to the same probability density function as in PP-ADMM.
Unlike in many privacy-preserving distributed algorithms, e.g. in [11] , [12] and [17] , the agents in Algorithms 1 and 2 draw samples only once before the start of iterations. This is due to a distinctive feature of distributed OPF in (4), where the sensitivity of agent responses to loads does not depend on the parameters updated over iterations (see Proposition 1) . It leads us to the following results. Theorem 4. Using Algorithms 1 and 2, whenever Conditions 1 and 2 hold, there is no additional privacy loss (information gain) accumulated over iteration. More formally,d ν i −d k i = 0, for agent i and ∀ν = k.
Proof. For two subsequent iterations, where Conditions 1 and 2 hold, the difference between observed load expresses as a function of input and output communication signals, i.e.,
for PP-ADMM Algorithm 1, and
for DP-ADMM Algorithm 2, where· stands for perturbed variable with noise ξ i . By expressing B ⊤ i θ i from (11) and substituting it into (10), it finds thatd ν i −d ν 1 i ∝ (ξ i − ξ i ) = 0 for the two algorithms. The same applies to any iteration pair, i.e.,d ν i −d k i = 0, ν = k, for which Conditions 1-2 hold. Finally, we notice that the feasibility of OPF solution is not affected by either primal or dual perturbations. Indeed, Algorithm 1 solely perturbs the objective function of consensus optimization (4b) while Algorithm 2 solely perturbs the agent objective function in (4a). The perturbations, though, may affect the Lipschitz continuity of objective functions, therefore influencing the convergence of distributed OPF. However, our experiments show that this is not the case for a series of power system networks even at scale, as we show it next.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
The experiments are performed on power system testbeds available with PowerModels.jl v0.12.2 [20] using JuMP.jl v0.19.2 [21] . All data and codes are relegated to the ecompanion [22] . By default, we select model parameters ǫ = 1, ν = 10 4 , ρ = 10 3 , γ = 5 × 10 −2 , q i = 10, and c 2i = 0.01c 1i if not provided in the testbed. We first demonstrate the privacy risks in the face of attack in Section V-A. Then, we provide an illustration of privacy-preservation algorithms in Section V-B, and examine their cost and algorithmic performance in Sections V-C and V-D, respectively.
A. Exploring privacy risks
We show that attack models (5) suffice to disclose the actual load values from the ADMM communications when no privacy-preserving measures are used. In differential privacy terms, the privacy loss in this case amounts to ǫ → ∞. In the interest of illustration, we run the base ADMM with ν = 10 4 , ρ = 10 2 , γ = 5 × 10 −2 , q i = 10 2 . Fig. 2 displays the instance of load inference at the second node of the IEEE 14-node RTS using attack model (5a). Here, Condition 1 required for the successful attack holds during the most of iterations, whereas Condition 2 always holds due to sufficient capacity of adjacent transmission lines. Furthermore, the right plot displays the frequency of observed values over iterations disclosing the actual load as the most frequent one. The similar privacy risks exist in other networks according to the results in Table I . The violation of load privacy is recorded if the true value of load has been observed across 10% of iterations or more. Even for the real-size instances, the privacy risks exist for the majority of loads. However, using Algorithms 1 and 2, the privacy loss can be controlled allowing for hiding the actual load during the attack, as we show it next.
B. Preserving privacy: illustrative examples
We use the IEEE 118-node RTS, where the privacy is provided for selected PV and PQ nodes. The privacy loss is controlled by choosing ǫ = 1 and varying adjacency α i ∈ {∼ 0, 10, 30, 50}%. Fig. 3 explains how privacy can be controlled through a fine tuning of parameter α i . When α i ∼ 0, the noise induced by Laplace mechanism practically amounts to zero rendering the randomized Algorithm 2 as its deterministic counterpart in (4), thus disclosing the actual load value. With increasing α i , the agent responses obey certain probability distributions, such that at every run of ADMM an adversary only observes some samples from the induced distributions. We notice that ǫ = 1 is a suitable choice as the majority of probability mass in Fig. 3 is contained within the range of ±α i centered around the actual load value. The probability density of observed loads across 1000 simulation rounds significantly flattens in α i , thus bringing the performance of privacy attacks closer to that of random guessing. With Fig. 4 , we further show that both privacy-preserving algorithms achieve the same load distributions providing the same privacy guarantees in practice.
Finally, we notice that the presence of loads and their installed capacities are often common knowledge. Therefore, large values of adjacency, e.g., 30%-50% are likely unnecessary. To provide privacy in a reasonable way, we consider α up to 15% that hides the actual load in a range up to ±15%. 
C. Optimality loss vs. privacy
As Laplace mechanism produces larger noise for stronger privacy requirements, the optimality of the OPF solution reduces, as shown in Tables II and III. Table II reports the optimality loss when assigning α uniformly over all PV nodes in the system. Although the loss is case-dependent, there is a general trend that the smaller the density of PV-nodes, the smaller the optimality loss. Moreover, in all cases, the optimality loss in percentage does not exceed the adjacency expressed in percentage. Hence, the privacy-preserving ADMM Algorithms 1 and 2 provide more privacy than lost optimality. When it comes to privacy preservation of individual PV-nodes, perturbations of agent response do not significantly affect the optimality of OPF solution. When providing privacy for the entire set of controllable loads, the optimality loss exceeds several orders of magnitude. This is mainly due to generally larger sensitivities of PQ nodes and their dominant position in our setup. When it comes to individuals nodes, the loss is network-specific as reported in Table III . It only makes sense to provide privacy for the loads with smaller sensitivities to minimize system-wide impacts. These results are consistent with those of Zhou et al. [13] , i.e., the extend to which privacy can be provided in a meaningful way (in a least-cost way in our case) significantly depends on the network of interest. 
